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Supreme Court No. 97417-9
(COA No. 51255-6-II)

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

IVON CRANSHAW,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR COWLITZ COUNTY

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTSi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIESiii

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER..... 1

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION..... 1

C. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

E. ARGUMENT 5

Review should be granted because of the conflict between this case and other published decisions of the Court of Appeals and because it involves an important question of constitutional law. 5

 1. The government must establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt, which may be either actual or constructive..... 6

 2. Proximity and knowledge is insufficient to establish constructive possession. 7

 3. Although Mr. Cranshaw was the driver of the car were the drugs were found, he did not have a possessory interest in the car, which the passenger borrowed from another person. 10

 4. Mr. Cranshaw’s suspicion that there might be drugs in Ms. Woods rented car is also insufficient to establish dominion and control. 13

 5. The failure to establish Mr. Cranshaw possessed the methamphetamine secreted in the center console of the rental car requires dismissal. 14

F. CONCLUSION 15

APPENDIX 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970)..... 6

Washington Supreme Court

State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 459 P.2d 400 (1969).....
..... 12, 15

State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 43 P.3d 513 (2002).....
..... 6

State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).....
..... 6

Washington Court of Appeals

State v. Bowen, 157 Wn. App. 821, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010).....
..... 11

State v. Bradford, 60 Wn. App. 857, 808 P.2d 174 (1991).....
..... 6

State v. Chouinard, 169 Wn. App. 895, 282 P.3d 117 (2012)
..... 6, 13

State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997)....
..... 8

State v. George, 146 Wn. App. 906, 193 P.3d 693 (2008).....
..... 7, 9, 14

State v. Hystad, 36 Wn. App. 42, 671 P.2d 793 (1983).....
..... 7

State v. Lakotiy, 151 Wn. App. 699, 214 P.3d 181 (2009).....
..... 6

State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969)
..... 11

State v. Spruell, 57 Wn. App. 383, 788 P.2d 21 (1990) 8

Rules

RAP 13.3..... 1

RAP 13.4..... 1, 6, 15

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Ivon Cranshaw, petitioner here and appellant below, asks this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review designated in Part B of this petition pursuant to RAP 13.3 and RAP 13.4.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Mr. Cranshaw seeks review of the Court of Appeals decision dated June 11, 2019, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A.

C. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Evidence of possession is insufficient where the government is cannot establish the defendant exercised dominion and control over the charged contraband. Is dismissal required where the government failed to establish Mr. Cranshaw exercised dominion and control over methamphetamines found in the center console of a car rented to another person, when the only other evidence of possession was his proximity to the contraband and his

suspicion there drugs in the car, along with two drug pipes found in the possession of the passenger?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ivon Cranshaw's mother died after a prolonged illness on May 1, 2017. RP 340, 322. She lived in a large rental house, with seven bedrooms for the grandchildren she cared for. RP 345, 321. In order to avoid eviction from his mother's house, Mr. Cranshaw needed to clear up some paperwork with the agency, including his mother's death certificate. RP 341. These issues arose as Mr. Cranshaw was preparing for his mother's funeral. RP 342. Dahlia Arreola, who cared for Mr. Cranshaw's mother before her death, helped Mr. Cranshaw put together the paperwork he needed for the funeral and to take over the lease. RP 326, 321.

On May 11, 2017, Mr. Cranshaw called Traditia Wood for a ride to the coroner's office and the rental agency. RP 344. Ms. Wood was driving a rented blue Mini Cooper. RP 357. The car's rental agreement was in another person's name. RP 191. She agreed to take Mr. Cranshaw on his errands. RP 344. Ms.

Wood arrived at the house. RP 322. She spoke with Ms. Arreola in her room. RP 323. Ms. Wood showed Ms. Arreola two methamphetamine pipes and asked Ms. Arreola if she wanted to smoke with her. RP 323. Ms. Arreola declined. RP 323. Ms. Wood put the pipes back in her purse. RP 323. No evidence was presented Mr. Cranshaw ever knew about the drug pipes.

The police secured an arrest warrant for Ms. Wood and were looking for her. RP 194. She was being investigated for theft related felonies. RP 196. The police knew Ms. Wood was associated with the Mini Cooper parked outside Mr. Cranshaw's mother's house. RP 191. When the detective watching the Mini Cooper saw two people leave the house in the rented car, he followed them. RP 191. The detective drove next to the rental car to confirm Ms. Wood was in the car and then asked a marked police car to pull the car over. RP 192. Once stopped, the police arrested Ms. Wood. RP 194. Mr. Cranshaw, who was driving, cooperated with the police, staying in the car while they processed his identification. RP

194. The police discovered he had a suspended license and arrested him for that charge. RP 205.

Based on information the police obtained from Ms. Wood, they believed there were methamphetamines inside the rental car. RP 197. The police impounded the car and secured a search warrant. RP 220. Inside the center console of the rental car, the police found a cigarette pack, which contained two grams of methamphetamines. RP 235. The police found two glass pipes used for smoking methamphetamines inside Ms. Wood's purse. RP 222, 241. Mr. Cranshaw's paperwork from his mother's death was also in the car. RP 168.

While heading to the police station, the transport officer said Mr. Cranshaw "mentioned something about possibly having drugs in the vehicle and some other items." RP 203. At trial, Mr. Cranshaw strongly denied making this statement. RP 352. He testified he told the police he did not know anything about drugs in the car but needed the paperwork he brought with him. RP 205, 352.

Mr. Cranshaw was charged with possession of a controlled substance. CP 3-4. At trial, the prosecution argued Mr. Cranshaw constructively possessed the drugs. RP 395-96. At the close of the government's case, Mr. Cranshaw moved to dismiss the charge for failure to prove possession. RP 306. The court denied Mr. Cranshaw's motion. RP 314. The jury found Mr. Cranshaw guilty. RP 422.

E. ARGUMENT

Review should be granted because of the conflict between this case and other published decisions of the Court of Appeals and because it involves an important question of constitutional law.

In affirming Mr. Cranshaw's conviction, the Court of Appeals held that his proximity to drugs in a car he was driving but did not own was sufficient to prove his guilt, even though there was another person in the car who was just as likely to have possessed the controlled substance. App. 6. This is not a consistent opinion in the published case law, as detailed below, and is an important issue of constitutional law that should be resolved by this Court. This Court should accept review to resolve the issue of conflict in the Court of

Appeals about when a person exercises dominion and control over an illegal substance. RAP 13.4(b).

1. *The government must establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt, which may be either actual or constructive.*

Due process requires the government to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); *State v. Green*, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). Dismissal is required where the government is unable to meet this burden. *State v. Chouinard*, 169 Wn. App. 895, 903, 282 P.3d 117 (2012).

A possessory offense can be proved through actual or constructive possession. *State v. Lakotiy*, 151 Wn. App. 699, 714, 214 P.3d 181 (2009). While possession may be actual or constructive, mere proximity is insufficient to establish dominion and control. *State v. Bradford*, 60 Wn. App. 857, 862, 808 P.2d 174 (1991); *see also State v. Duncan*, 146 Wn.2d 166, 182, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). Knowledge of the presence of contraband, without more, is also insufficient to show

dominion and control. *State v. Hystad*, 36 Wn. App. 42, 49, 671 P.2d 793 (1983).

2. Proximity and knowledge is insufficient to establish constructive possession.

In *State v. George*, the Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument that proximity and knowledge of the controlled substances is sufficient to prove dominion and control. 146 Wn. App. 906, 912-13, 193 P.3d 693 (2008). In *George*, four persons were arrested in a vehicle. *Id.* The government established Mr. George was in close proximity to the eight-inch-long water pipe found next to where Mr. George was seated and that he knew it was there. *Id.* The government, however, produced no evidence Mr. George used the pipe. *Id.* at 922. Additionally, the government offered no evidence to rule out the other occupants of the vehicle. *Id.* Even though Mr. George knew about the water pipe and was close to it, the court held this was insufficient to establish dominion and control. *Id.* at 923.

In *State v. Spruell*, the Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence of possession of a controlled substance

when the government established Mr. Spruell was seated near a table where police observed cocaine residue, a scale, vials, and a razor blade. 57 Wn. App. 383, 384, 788 P.2d 21 (1990). In dismissing the possession charge, the *Spruell* Court considered why the defendant was in the house where the drugs were found, how long he had been there, and whether he had ever been in the house before. *Id.* at 388-89. Without some evidence tying the Mr. Spreull to the drugs, even where he was in close proximity and knew about the drugs, dismissal was required. *Id.*

Instead of relying on these cases, the Court of Appeals relied on *State v. Echeverria*, where the court found sufficient evidence of constructive possession of a firearm found at the defendant's feet in a car he was driving. App. 5. (citing *Echeverria*, 85 Wn. App. 777, 783, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997)). The Court of Appeals recognized that not only did Mr. Echevarria know about the firearm, but it was in plain site, at his feet. *Id.* It could easily be reduced to actual possession. These facts are inconsistent with Mr. Cranshaw's arrest.

Here, the controlled substances were not in plain site. Instead, they were secreted in cigarette pack inside a small bag, located in the center console. RP 284. Like in *George*, Mr. Cranshaw was not the only person in the car when it was stopped. RP 191. Mr. Cranshaw may have been sitting in close proximity to the drugs, but they were not immediately apparent to him like the water pipe was in *George*, as they were hidden in a cigarette pack in the center console. RP 235.

The only evidence linking the drugs to anyone were the methamphetamine pipes found in Ms. Wood's purse, which Ms. Wood brought into in the rental car without Mr. Cranshaw when she got into the car. RP 357. The drugs were found in the center console, right next to her seat. RP 235. She had two methamphetamine pipes in her purse, along with her identification. RP 241. She was also a known drug user, having offered to smoke methamphetamines with a person immediately before her arrest. RP 323. She was wanted for felony crimes. RP 196.

Further, the drugs were found stacked with the car's rental agreement, which did not have Mr. Cranshaw's name on it. RP 242. All of Mr. Cranshaw's paperwork about his mother was on the rear seat of the car, far away from the drugs. RP 205, 352. The drugs were secreted inside a cigarette pack, inside a smaller bag. RP 248. No evidence was produced to demonstrate that Mr. Cranshaw had used or even touched the found drugs. RP 284. The police conducted no forensic tests to determine ownership. RP 284. Other than being the driver of the car, there was no evidence tying Mr. Cranshaw to the drugs.

3. Although Mr. Cranshaw was the driver of the car where the drugs were found, he did not have a possessory interest in the car, which the passenger borrowed from another person.

Mr. Cranshaw was the driver of the car where the drugs were found, but he had very tenuous connections to the car itself. The evidence established the car had been rented by someone other than Mr. Cranshaw. RP 242. The police were interested in the car because of Ms. Wood's relationship to it. RP 191. In fact, the police stopped the car in order to arrest

Ms. Wood. RP 194. They knew she had a relationship to the car. RP 191.

Other cases examining dominion and control issues for the drivers of vehicles do not appear to have examined the issue when the vehicle in question is a rental car. *See, e.g., State v. Bowen*, 157 Wn. App. 821, 828, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010) (citing *State v. Potts*, 1 Wn. App. 614, 617, 464 P.2d 742 (1969)). In these cases, the driver was the sole occupant of the car as well as its owner. *Bowen*, 157 Wn. App. at 828; *Potts*, 1 Wn. App. at 617. Here, Mr. Cranshaw was only driving the car because Ms. Wood had temporarily given him permission to do so, while she sat next to him. RP 344. He had no ownership interest in the car and cannot be presumed to know or to have possessed the car's entire contents from his brief presence in the car.

The driver of another person's rental car is more analogous to a house guest, where this Court has examined the inability of the government to establish possession for house guests. In *State v. Callahan*, this Court determined

there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for possession of narcotics. 77 Wn.2d 27, 31, 459 P.2d 400 (1969). Mr. Callahan was present and his personal possessions were in the same houseboat the police found drugs visibly places along with other paraphernalia, including scales used to measure drugs. *Id.* This Court also found Mr. Callahan had been staying on the houseboat for two or three days. *Id.* In finding insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Callahan of possession, this Court held the government had failed to prove dominion and control over the contraband or the premise where the contraband was located. *Id.* at 30–31. This Court also held that even though the defendant had stayed at the houseboat for a few days and kept his possessions there, this was insufficient to establish dominion and control over drugs found on the houseboat that did not belong to him. *Id.* at 31.

The evidence of dominion and control is even more tenuous here than in *Callahan*. Only circumstantial evidence points to any dominion and control of the drugs found in the

center console of Ms. Wood's rental car. *Callahan*, 77 Wn.2d at 31-32. Mr. Cranshaw was driving the rental car but had no other connection to it. It was rented to another person and was known by the police to be a car Ms. Wood had been using. RP 242, 191. Mr. Cranshaw had no connection to the drugs found in the in the rental car. The evidence at trial established only that Mr. Cranshaw was driving the rented car, not that he had dominion and control over the rented car or the drugs found in the center console.

4. Mr. Cranshaw's suspicion that there might be drugs in Ms. Woods rented car is also insufficient to establish dominion and control.

The police stated Mr. Cranshaw thought there might be drugs in the Mini Cooper. RP 203. But knowledge of contraband is not sufficient to establish possession.

Chouinard, 169 Wn. App. at 898. Mr. Cranshaw may have known Ms. Wood was in possession of the drugs found in the rental car, but this does not mean the drugs were his. In *Chouinard*, the defendant acknowledged that he knew about the rifle that was behind his seat. *Id.* at 902-03. Even with

this fact, the Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Chouinard's conviction, holding that the government had failed to establish dominion and control. *Id.* In *George*, the Court of Appeals also found insufficient evidence of possession, even though the defendant knew that the marijuana water pipe was in the car. 146 Wn. App. at 923.

5. The failure to establish Mr. Cranshaw possessed the methamphetamine secreted in the center console of the rental car requires dismissal.

Mr. Cranshaw did not have dominion and control over the rented car or the drugs found in the center console. He did not own or rent the car and had a very temporary connection with it, having only started driving it minutes before he was stopped by the police. There was no evidence introduced Mr. Cranshaw had anything other than a transitory relationship with the car. This is insufficient proof to establish dominion and control.

The government failed to establish Mr. Cranshaw exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine found in the center console of Ms. Wood's rental car. Mere

proximity and knowledge of the drug's presence in the vehicle are not enough to establish possession. Only purely circumstantial evidence connects Mr. Cranshaw to the controlled substances. It is unreasonable to rely on such evidence given the facts established here. *Callahan*, 77 Wn.2d at 31-32.

The Court of Appeals decision to the contrary is in conflict with other published decision of this Court and the Court of Appeals. This is a significant issue of constitutional law and involves an issue of substantial public interest. RAP 13.4(b). Review should be granted.

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, petitioner Ivon Cranshaw respectfully requests that review be granted. RAP 13.4 (b).

DATED this 11th day of July, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. Stearns', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

TRAVIS STEARNS (WSBA 29935)
Washington Appellate Project (91052)
Attorneys for Appellant

APPENDIX

Table of Contents

Court of Appeals Opinion	App. 1
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June 11, 2019

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

IVON STEPHEN CRANSHAW,

Appellant.

No. 51255-6-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MAXA, C.J. – Ivon Cranshaw appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance, which arose when law enforcement found methamphetamine in the center console of a vehicle that Cranshaw was driving but did not own. We hold that (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Cranshaw constructively possessed the methamphetamine, and (2) the trial court on remand must determine whether the criminal filing fee and DNA collection fee must be stricken under the 2018 amendments to the legal financial obligation (LFO) statutes.

Accordingly, we affirm Cranshaw’s conviction of possession of a controlled substance, but remand for the trial court to determine whether the criminal filing fee and DNA collection fee must be stricken from the judgment and sentence.

FACTS

In May 2017, Cranshaw called Traditia Wood to ask for a ride because he needed to file some paperwork. Wood arrived in a car. Cranshaw got into the driver’s seat of the car and began driving with Wood in the passenger seat to run his errands. Cranshaw had his paperwork on the backseat of the car.

Longview Police conducted a traffic stop of the car to arrest Wood, who was a suspect in another case. Wood was placed under arrest. Cranshaw also was arrested for driving with a suspended license. Detective Trevor Eades transported Cranshaw to jail.

Officers obtained a search warrant for the car Cranshaw was driving. During the subsequent search of the vehicle, officers found methamphetamine hidden in a cigarette pack in the center console between the driver and passenger seats. They also found documents showing that the vehicle was rented, but neither Cranshaw's nor Wood's names were on the rental agreement. And officers found paperwork with Cranshaw's name on it. The State charged Cranshaw with possession of a controlled substance.

At trial, Eades testified that during the ride to the jail, Cranshaw asked what was happening with the car and "mentioned something about possibly having drugs in the vehicle." Report of Proceedings at 203-04. Cranshaw testified in his own defense that he had not known about the methamphetamine and that he had only asked Eades about the search of the car because he was concerned about recovering the paperwork he needed to file.

The jury found Cranshaw guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found that Cranshaw was indigent but ordered him to pay mandatory LFOs, including a criminal filing fee and a DNA collection fee.

Cranshaw appeals his conviction and the trial court's imposition of the criminal filing fee and the DNA collection fee.

ANALYSIS

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Cranshaw argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the methamphetamine found in the car. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Cardenas-Flores*, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant admits the truth of the evidence and the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the State. *Id.* at 265-66. Credibility determinations are made by the trier of fact and are not subject to review. *Id.* at 266. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. *Id.*

2. Constructive Possession

A person can have actual possession or constructive possession of an item. *State v. Reichert*, 158 Wn. App. 374, 390, 242 P.3d 44 (2010). Actual possession requires physical custody of the item. *Id.* Constructive possession occurs when a person has “dominion and control” over an item. *Id.* A person can have possession without exclusive control; more than one person can be in possession of the same item. *State v. George*, 146 Wn. App. 906, 920, 193 P.3d 693 (2008).

To determine whether sufficient evidence proves that a defendant had dominion and control over an item, we examine the totality of the circumstances. *State v. Lakotiy*, 151 Wn. App. 699, 714, 214 P.3d 181 (2009). Aspects of dominion and control include whether the defendant could immediately convert the item to his or her actual possession, *State v. Jones*, 146 Wn.2d 328, 333, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002); the defendant’s physical proximity to the item, *State v. Chouinard*, 169 Wn. App. 895, 900, 282 P.3d 117 (2012); and whether the defendant had dominion and control over the premises where the item was located. *State v. Shumaker*, 142 Wn.

App. 330, 334, 174 P.3d 1214 (2007); *see generally* *Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal* 50.03 (4th ed. 2016).

However, the defendant's proximity to an item alone is not enough to establish constructive possession. *Jones*, 146 Wn.2d at 333. Similarly, the defendant's knowledge of the item's presence on a premises alone is insufficient to show constructive possession. *Chouinard*, 169 Wn. App. at 899. And even proximity plus knowledge of an item's presence may not be sufficient to establish dominion and control over the item. *See George*, 146 Wn. App. at 923.¹

3. Totality of Circumstances Analysis

We must conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether sufficient evidence exists that Cranshaw had constructive possession of the methamphetamine found in the vehicle.

Here, the State presented evidence of three factors that are relevant to determining whether Cranshaw had constructive possession of the methamphetamine. First, Cranshaw was in close proximity to the methamphetamine; it was in the center console right next to him. Second, there was evidence that Cranshaw knew that there were drugs in the vehicle based on his statement to Eades. Third, Cranshaw was driving the vehicle in which the methamphetamine was found. These factors show that Cranshaw could have immediately converted the methamphetamine to his actual possession.

¹ A person's dominion and control over a premises "creates a rebuttable presumption that the person has dominion and control over items on the premises." *Reichert*, 158 Wn. App. at 390. Courts have found sufficient evidence that a defendant had dominion and control over a vehicle when the defendant was driving a vehicle that he or she owns. *State v. Bowen*, 157 Wn. App. 821, 828, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010); *State v. Turner*, 103 Wn. App. 515, 523-24, 13 P.3d 234 (2000). But Cranshaw was not the owner of the vehicle he was driving. We do not address whether a presumption of dominion and control exists when the defendant is driving a vehicle he or she does not own.

Each of these circumstances *standing alone* may not be sufficient to establish that Cranshaw had constructive possession of the methamphetamine. The issue is whether the *combination* of these circumstances is sufficient.

In both *Chouinard* and *George*, the courts held that knowledge of and proximity to an item were not enough to prove constructive possession by a defendant who did not have dominion and control over the vehicle. *Chouinard*, 169 Wn. App. at 902-03; *George*, 146 Wn. App. at 923. But in both cases the defendant was a mere passenger in the vehicle, not the driver, and the courts distinguished cases in which the defendant was the driver. *Chouinard*, 169 Wn. App. at 900-03; *George*, 146 Wn. App. at 920-23. *Chouinard* and *George* do not control here because Cranshaw was the driver.

In *State v. Echeverria*, the court found sufficient evidence that the defendant had constructive possession of a firearm when he was driving another person's car and the firearm was at the defendant's feet. 85 Wn. App. 777, 783, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997). The court noted the rule that constructive possession can be established by showing dominion and control over the premises where the firearm was found, but did not expressly rely on the defendant's driving the vehicle. *Id.* The court also referenced the ability to reduce an object to actual possession as an aspect of dominion and control. *Id.* The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could find constructive possession based on the fact that the firearm was in plain sight at the defendant's feet and the inference that he knew it was there. *Id.*

The facts here are similar to those in *Echeverria*. Cranshaw was driving the vehicle where the methamphetamine was found, it was right next to him and there was evidence that he knew it was there, and it easily could be reduced to his immediate possession.

We hold that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Cranshaw had constructive possession of the methamphetamine. Therefore, we reject Cranshaw's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his conviction.

B. CRIMINAL FILING FEE AND DNA COLLECTION FEE

Cranshaw argues that the criminal filing fee and the DNA collection fee that the trial court imposed as mandatory LFOs must be stricken. The State takes no position on this issue and defers to this court's judgment. We conclude that the trial court must make this determination.

In 2018, the legislature amended (1) RCW 36.18.020(2)(h), which now prohibits imposition of the criminal filing fee on a defendant who is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c); and (2) RCW 43.43.7541, which now states that the DNA collection fee no longer is mandatory if the offender's DNA previously had been collected because of a prior conviction. The Supreme Court in *State v. Ramirez* held that these amendments apply prospectively to cases pending on direct appeal. 191 Wn.2d 732, 749-50, 426 P.3d 714 (2018).

Here, the trial court found that Cranshaw was indigent at the time of sentencing. Therefore, under the current version of RCW 43.43.7541, the criminal filing fee imposed on Cranshaw must be stricken. However, the record is unclear if the trial court found Cranshaw indigent based on the definitions in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) as required in RCW 36.18.020(2)(h). We remand for the trial court to determine whether Cranshaw is indigent under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c) and therefore whether the criminal filing fee must be stricken.


Regarding the DNA collection fee, neither the parties nor the appellate record show that Cranshaw's DNA previously has been collected even though Cranshaw has been convicted of several felonies in Washington. We remand for the trial court to determine whether Cranshaw's

DNA previously has been collected and therefore whether the DNA collection fee imposed on Cranshaw must be stricken.

CONCLUSION


We affirm Cranshaw's conviction of possession of a controlled substance, but we remand for the trial court to determine whether the criminal filing fee and DNA collection fee must be stricken from the judgment and sentence.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.



MAXA, C.J.

We concur:



MELNICK, J.



SUTTON, J.

DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 51255-6-II**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office / residence / e-mail address as listed on ACORDS / WSBA website:

- respondent Ryan Jurvakainen
[appeals@co.cowlitz.wa.us][Jurvakainen.ryan@co.cowlitz.wa.us]
Cowlitz County Prosecuting Attorney
- petitioner
- Attorney for other party



MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant
Washington Appellate Project

Date: July 11, 2019

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

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